Structural Mediation Failure in Multipolar Conflicts: Power Divergence, Drone Warfare, and the Armenia–Azerbaijan Case, 1992–2026

Abstract

This article elucidates the persistent ineffectiveness of mediation in the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict by presenting a conditional theory that synthesises structural realism, liberal institutionalism, and offence–defence theory. It enquires why consecutive mediation frameworks—the OSCE Minsk Process, Russia's orchestrated instability, the 2020 conflict and truce, and Western mediation—failed to yield lasting peace. The research contends that mediation results are influenced by the interplay of three structural variables: external power convergence, institutional enforcement capacity, and the offence-defence equilibrium established by military technology. The article employs theory-testing process tracing, structured focused comparison, and a meticulous counterfactual analysis of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) scenario to illustrate that mediation was successful only when great powers were adequately aligned to constrain spoilers; institutions had credible enforcement capabilities; and the military equilibrium did not disproportionately favour unilateral aggression. The 2020 conflict, propelled by Azerbaijan's drone-enhanced offensive dominance, and Russia's strategic overextension post-2022 serve as pivotal moments when these circumstances deteriorated. The counterfactual shows that other foreign power configurations during the 2020 ceasefire could have changed the trend. The data further demonstrates that connectivity projects like TRIPP have evolved into battlegrounds of great-power rivalry, with Russian and Iranian opposition limiting their execution. The results promote a verifiable conditional theory of mediation efficacy in multipolar conflicts, emphasising the importance of enforcement capability and power congruence in achieving enduring peace.